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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

BRENT SCOWCROFT

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Following is a report to you from Dr. Kissinger regarding his second meeting with the Chinese.

- "1. I had a 3 1/2 hour session with Chou En-Lai, the Foreign Minister and Vice Minister Chiao Kuan-Hua this afternoon which covered most major international issues which we will explore further during this visit. There was a separate counterpart meeting which began discussions on bilateral issues such as trade and exchanges.
- 2. At Chou's invitation I made an opening presentation which covered most of our session. He asked questions and made comments but reserved most of his positions for subsequent meetings. While it is not yet clear to what extent he wishes, or can, move forward in our relations, so far their basic strategic perspective seems essentially unchanged, including their preoccupation with the Soviet Union and their desire to continue the normalization process with us.
- 3. I said that our bilateral relations were going forward well and that our exchange programs were important both for their content and their symbolizing of our developing relationship; we are prepared to consider all means to emphasize this symbolic aspect. On Taiwan, I reaffirmed your commitments and intention to carry out the principles of the Shanghai communique.
- 4. I went over again at some length Soviet Union policy and pointed to your handling of the Middle East crisis to demonstrate our realism and firmness. Chou praised you highly for your ordering the alert and was scathing of your domestic critics. I also rehearsed the rationale for the Agreement to End Nuclear War.

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5. Chou welcomed your Middle East policy and the results of my trip. As I mentioned in yesterday's report, he shares our basic perspective on this region and welcomes the negotiating role we plan to play. He indicated that he had already been helpful with Egypt and I said that we would welcome his continued counseling to the Arabs about our good intentions and the need for some patience. I made clear that while we will press for a just settlement, we will continue to defend the existence of Israel. Chou suggested we talk directly to Syria, shared our perception of Iraq, urged inclusion of the Palestinians in the negotiations and agreed that the Shah of Iran is far-sighted.

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- 6. On Indochina, I warned of the serious consequences of a renewed North Vietnamese offensive in Vietnam, and left it to Chou whether he wished to explore Cambodia. On the latter issue, I reaffirmed our openness to a reasonable negotiating settlement. He reiterated that we devoted too much energy to this small corner of the globe and said that he would have to think over whether he wished to pursue this issue further.
- 7. Chou rehearsed the PRC suspicion of India, though perhaps in somewhat more muted fashion than previously. I said that we sought an improving of relations with New Delhi but would proceed slowly. He reaffirmed their support of Pakistan and said they were concerned about Soviet influence in Afghanistan. I outlined our general approach to this whole region.
- 8. On the Korean item in the UN, Chou said they might need some more time to line up their co-sponsors on the compromise resolution which we and the Chinese agreed upon this past week. They emphasized that they stood by the language we had worked out, and only wished to avoid the appearance of US-Chinese imposition by moving too fast. On this basis I have instructed Scali to consult with their Ambassador in New York and to agree to a delay if the Chinese there believe they need it.
- 9. Chou reiterated that Japan is at a crossroads and I once again emphasized the importance of that country staying close to the US. He did not demur when I said that it would be healthier for us to join in Siberian development rather than leaving this to the Japanese alone. I said that we had not made a final decision, however.

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10. We meet again tomorrow afternoon and there will be continuing counterpart talks on bilateral technical issues as well.

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